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The Pledge of Allegiance and Compelled Speech Revisited:
Requiring Parental Consent
CAROLINE MALA CORBIN*
Since the Supreme Court decided West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette
in 1943, free speech law has been clear: public schools may not force students to
recite the Pledge of Allegiance. Nevertheless, in two states—Texas and Florida—
students may decline to participate only with parental permission. The Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the law on the grounds that the parental requirement
furthered parents’ substantive due process right to control the upbringing of their
children.
The Eleventh Circuit decision is flawed both in its understanding of the First
Amendment right to be free of compelled speech and the substantive due process
rights of parents. These mandatory pledge laws are viewpoint-based and therefore
presumptively unconstitutional. While the free speech rights of students are more
circumscribed than adults, none of the established justifications for curtailing
student speech rights at school apply in this case. On the contrary, forcing students
to pledge against their will exemplifies all the harms of compelled speech. Finally,
parents’ constitutional right to control the upbringing of their children is meant to
protect parents from the state, not to empower parents to trample on the rights of
their children. In the end, the parental permission rule is simply a pretext for the
state’s own viewpoint-based compulsion.

* Professor of Law & Dean’s Distinguished Scholar, University of Miami School of
Law; B.A., Harvard University; J.D. Columbia Law School. I would like to thank Luciana
Jhon Urrunaga and Alejandra De La Camara for their ace research assistance, as well as the
wonderful team at Indiana Law Journal. Thanks also to Alexander Tsesis, without whom the
symposium would not have happened.
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INTRODUCTION
I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America,
and to the Republic for which it stands, one Nation under God,
indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.
Every day, in public school classrooms across the country, students begin their
morning by reciting the Pledge of Allegiance. Many believe the thirty-one word
pledge unifies children of disparate backgrounds and inspires love of country.1 It is,
after all, a pledge to the American flag, a foundational symbol of the United States.
However, not all students are as keen about the pledge as the legislatures and
school boards that instituted these recitations. Fortunately for these students, the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution gives them the right to opt out of these
ostensibly patriotic exercises. In addition to protecting the right to speak, the Free
Speech Clause also protects the right not to speak.2 Moreover, the Supreme Court

1. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 6 (2004) (“[T]he Pledge of
Allegiance evolved as a common public acknowledgment of the ideals that our flag
symbolizes. Its recitation is a patriotic exercise designed to foster national unity and pride in
those principles.”).
2. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 645 (1943) (Murphy, J.,
concurring) (“The right of freedom of thought and of religion as guaranteed by the
Constitution against State action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain
from speaking at all.”); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (“[T]he right of
freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the
right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”).

366027-ILJ 97-3_Text.indd 172

5/5/22 2:59 PM

2022]

REQUIRING PARENTAL CONSENT

969

specifically held in 1943 that students in public schools cannot be forced to recite the
pledge. Thus, since World War II, students have had a constitutional right to sit them
out.
Nevertheless, two states, Florida and Texas, curtail that right. In these states,
students may decline to join the daily pledge only with parental permission. In
Florida, for example, every public elementary, middle, and high school must start the
day with the pledge, and students are excused from reciting it “[u]pon written request
by his or her parent.”3 Texas law is similar.4
Not surprisingly, both laws have been challenged. Although the pledge is usually
recited first thing in the morning, Cameron Frazier found himself in math class at
Boynton Beach Community High School, Palm Beach County, when it was time for
the daily recitation.5 When ordered to stand, the high school junior tried to explain
to his teacher that he stopped participating in the sixth grade.6 After an unfruitful
exchange, his teacher upbraided him, telling Frazier “You clearly have no respect!
You are so ungrateful and so un-American.”7 The teacher then called the principal’s
office, and Frazier was removed from the classroom by the assistant principal and
school police officer.8
A similar story unfolded in Texas. India Landry was a student at Windfern High
School, near Houston.9 She too had a history of sitting down during the pledge as a
form of protest.10 Inspired by football player Colin Kaepernick,11 she explained, “I
felt the flag doesn’t represent what it stands for, liberty and justice for all, and I don’t
feel what is going on in the country, so it was my choice to remain seated, silently.

3. FLA. STAT. § 1003.44 (2021) (“The pledge of allegiance to the flag shall be recited at
the beginning of the day in each public elementary, middle, and high school in the state. . . .
Upon written request by his or her parent, the student must be excused from reciting the pledge,
including standing and placing the right hand over his or her heart.”).
4. Students in Texas must also pledge their allegiance to the Texas state flag each day
unless their parents excuse them. Landry v. Cypress Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 4:17CV-3004, 2018 WL 3436971, at *2 (S.D. Tex. July 17, 2018).
5. Frazier ex rel. Frazier v. Alexandre, 434 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1353–54 (S.D. Fla. 2006),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Frazier ex rel. Frazier v. Winn, 535 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir.
2008).
6. Frazier, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 1354.
7. Id. The exchange continued: “‘Do you know what’s out there fighting our war? That
flag you refuse to show respect to.’ (Am. Compl. ¶ 20.) Frazier replied ‘no, our soldiers are
out fighting a war. The flag is an inanimate piece of cloth that doesn't move and surely can't
hold a gun.’ Alexandre said ‘You are so ridiculous! I can't believe you are so disrespectful!’
(Am. Compl. ¶ 21.) Frazier tried to respond, saying ‘I choose not to say the . . .’ but was
interrupted by Alexandre who said ‘No! You're out of here. I'm so sick of you!’” Id.
8. Frazier, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 1354.
9. Landry, 2018 WL 3436971, at *1–2.
10. Id.
11. Alex Horton, A Black Student Refused to Recite the Pledge of Allegiance—
Challenging Texas Law Requiring It, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2018/09/26/black-student-refused-recite-pledgeallegiance-challenging-texas-law-requiring-it/ [https://perma.cc/RE9K-QDYG] (reporting
that student’s attorney “said her actions were partly inspired by Kaepernick’s protest of police
brutality”).
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It was a silent protest.”12 She too was berated for her “disrespectful” decision.13
Indeed, the principal expelled her from school.14 As Landry was leaving, the school
secretary remarked, “This is not the NFL.”15
The Texas Attorney General defended the law on the grounds that “[r]equiring
the pledge to be recited at the start of every school day has the laudable result of
fostering respect for our flag and a patriotic love of our country.” He continued, “This
case is about providing for the saying of the pledge of allegiance while respecting
the parental right to direct the education of children.”16 Texas settled with Landry in
2019 without a ruling on the law’s constitutionality,17 and the law is still on the
books.18 Florida, meanwhile, took it to the Eleventh Circuit and won.19 According to
the court of appeals panel, the law requiring parental permission furthered parents’
substantive due process rights to control the upbringing of their children.20
The Eleventh Circuit decision is flawed both in its understanding of the First
Amendment right to be free of compelled speech and the substantive due process
rights of parents. These mandatory pledge laws are viewpoint-based speech
requirements and are therefore presumptively unconstitutional. While the free speech
rights of students are more circumscribed than adults, none of the established
justifications for curtailing student speech rights at school apply in this case. On the
contrary, forcing students to pledge against their will exemplifies all the harms of
compelled speech. Finally, the claim that parents’ constitutional right to control the
upbringing of their children justifies making the right to refuse contingent on parental
permission misunderstands the nature of the parents’ right: it is meant to protect
parents from the state, not to empower parents to trample on the rights of their
children. The state’s invocation is instead a pretext for its own viewpoint-based,
unconstitutional compulsion.

12. Ryan Korsgard, What to Know About Civil Rights Lawsuit over Pledge Protest at CyFair ISD High School, NBC HOUSTON (July 19, 2018, 5:41 PM),
https://www.click2houston.com/news/2018/07/19/what-to-know-about-civil-rights-lawsuitover-pledge-protest-at-cy-fair-isd-high-school/ [https://perma.cc/LPW6-ENYL].
13. Landry, 2018 WL 3436971, at *1.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Emma Platoff, Attorney General Ken Paxton Defends Texas Law Requiring Students
to Stand for Pledge of Allegiance, TEX. TRIB., (Sept. 25, 2018),
https://www.texastribune.org/2018/09/25/ken-paxton-texas-law-student-stand-pledgeallegiance-/ [https://perma.cc/5H96-KLZU].
17. Landry, 2018 WL 3436971, at *7–8 (noting that “[t]here is no analogous case that has
determined the Texas Pledge Statute is not a violation of the Free Speech Clause”). In addition
to her free speech claims, Landry brought due process and equal protection ones. The district
court rejected the school’s motion to dismiss, id., and it eventually settled with Landry.
Settlement Reached in Texas Student’s Pledge of Allegiance Lawsuit, ABC 6 (Dec. 29, 2018),
https://6abc.com/4985473/ [https://perma.cc/HLA8-PJPU].
18. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 25.082 (West 2017).
19. Frazier ex rel. Frazier v. Winn, 535 F.3d 1279, 1285 (11th Cir. 2008) (“We conclude
that the State’s interest in recognizing and protecting the rights of parents on some educational
issues is sufficient to justify the restriction of some students’ freedom of speech.”).
20. Id. at 1284 (“The State, in restricting the student’s freedom of speech, advances the
protection of the constitutional rights of parents.”).
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Part I describes how these pledge laws are viewpoint-based and therefore
presumptively unconstitutional. Part II explains why none of the reasons to curtail
student speech apply in this case. Part III explores how forcing students to recite the
pledge exemplifies all of the harms of compelled speech. Finally, in applying strict
scrutiny, Part IV analyzes why parental rights cannot justify these harms, and Part V
concludes that even if parental rights were compelling, these laws are not narrowly
tailored.
I. PRESUMPTIVE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF PLEDGE LAWS
It is black letter law that content-based speech regulations are subject to strict
scrutiny, and that viewpoint-based ones are presumptively unconstitutional.21
Because they are viewpoint-based, the pledge laws in Florida and Texas should be
presumed to violate the Free Speech Clause.22
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the most rigorous scrutiny applies to
government laws that regulate speech based on its message.23 This strict scrutiny
applies to both laws that censor speech and laws that compel speech.24 The
government should not be in the business of controlling what speech we can see or
say.
The admonition is even stronger when the government attempts to regulate not
just the subject matter of speech, but its viewpoint. There is nothing more anathema
to a democracy than the government censoring perspectives it disapproves or forcing
people to parrot perspectives it espouses.25 As a consequence, viewpoint-based
regulations are assumed to be unconstitutional. At the very least, they are subject to
strict scrutiny and unlikely to pass muster.
The pledge laws in Florida and Texas are content-based and viewpoint-based.
They require recitation of particular content, making them incontrovertibly contentbased.26 But they are also structured to favor one particular viewpoint.27 Under the

21. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015) (“Content-based laws . . . are
presumptively unconstitutional.”).
22. And yet, as noted by the dissent to the Eleventh Circuit denial of en banc review,
“Notwithstanding that it is beyond peradventure that minors have constitutional rights, the
panel opinion fails to consider them, much less to weigh them.” Frazier ex rel. Frazier v.
Alexandre, 555 F.3d 1292, 1293 (11th Cir. 2009) (Barkett, J., dissenting).
23. The one exception to this rule—content-based but viewpoint-neutral regulations in a
nonpublic forum—does not apply, since mandatory pledges do not occur in nonpublic forums.
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 799–800, 806 (1985).
24. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 797 (1988) (“The
constitutional equivalence of compelled speech and compelled silence in the context of fully
protected expression was established in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.”).
25. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2299 (2019) (“[A] core postulate of free speech
law [is]: The government may not discriminate against speech based on the ideas or opinions
it conveys.”).
26. Reed, 576 U.S. at 163 (“Government regulation of speech is content based if a law
applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.”).
27. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1766 (2017) (“At its most basic, the test for viewpoint
discrimination is whether—within the relevant subject category—the government has singled
out a subset of messages for disfavor based on the views expressed.”).
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law, if parents do nothing, their child must participate in reciting the pledge. Only
with written parental permission may a child abstain. Because the law requires
parental consent for one viewpoint but not the other, it is viewpoint based. As such,
it is presumptively unconstitutional.
In favoring recitation of the pledge over sitting out the pledge, the government is
favoring more than patriotism. With the addition of “under God” during the Cold
War,28 the pledge also endorses a particular stance on religion. Consequently, some
students object to the pledge for religious reasons. According to Jehovah’s
Witnesses, they cannot join the pledge because “the flag salute [is] an act of worship,
and worship belongs to God; they cannot conscientiously give worship to anyone or
anything except God.”29 Other students may balk at its endorsement of monotheism.
As one high school student who stopped saying the pledge explained, “I have no
connection to religion whatsoever. The fact that they added the ‘under God’ part to
the Pledge of Allegiance doesn’t represent me, and it doesn’t represent others who
do not have religious affiliations.”30
Students also refuse to join their school’s daily Pledge of Allegiance for political
reasons. As long as the flag has symbolized the United States,31 people have targeted
the flag to protest injustices in the country. Some have done it by burning the flag;32
Others by refusing to salute it. One senior in high school remained seated during the
pledge because “[e]verything it’s saying is a lie—this isn’t a nation under God and
there isn’t justice for all.”33 Another protesting student remarked, “I wanted people
to see that there is social injustice, racial inequality and police brutality.”34
Many students are following the example of Colin Kaepernick, a former NFL
quarterback for the San Francisco 49ers.35 To bring attention to the systemic racism
suffered by black Americans, particularly police violence against young black men,

28. Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1032 (9th Cir. 2010) (“In
1954, during the escalating Cold War . . . Congress further amended the Pledge by changing
the phrase ‘one Nation indivisible’ to ‘one Nation under God, indivisible.’”).
29. WATCH TOWER BIBLE & TRACT SOC'Y OF PA., Moral Values that Merit Respect:
Jehovah’s Witnesses and Education, WATCHTOWER ONLINE LIBR., https://wol.jw.org
/en/wol/d/r1/lp-e/1101995044#h=9 [https://perma.cc/29Q5-GBZ9].
30. Valerie Safronova & Joanna Nikas, High School Students Explain Why They Protest
Anthems and Pledges, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/10/21/style/high-school-students-explain-why-they-protest-anthems-and-pledges.html
[https://perma.cc/L5QA-T3KX].
31. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405 (1989) (“The very purpose of a national flag is
to serve as a symbol of our country. . . . Pregnant with expressive content, the flag as readily
signifies this Nation as does the combination of letters found in ‘America.’”).
32. See, e.g., id. at 399 (noting that Johnson “burn[ed] an American flag as a means of
political protest”).
33. Priscella Vega, Lakewood High Confrontation: Student Refuses to Say Pledge, PRESS
TELEGRAM (Sept. 1, 2017, 1:10 AM), https://www.presstelegram.com/2015/09/18/lakewoodhigh-confrontation-student-refuses-to-say-pledge/ [https://perma.cc/49VR-TQ5A].
34. Safronova & Nikas, supra note 30.
35. Steve Wyche, Colin Kaepernick Explains Why He Sat During the National Anthem,
NFL (Aug. 27, 2016, 3:04 AM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000691077/
article/colin-kaepernick-explains-why-he-sat-during-national-anthem
[https://perma.cc/76GR-BJPC].
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Kaepernick began to kneel during the national anthem that starts so many sporting
events.36 “I am not going to stand up to show pride in a flag for a country that
oppresses black people and people of color . . . I have to stand up for people that are
oppressed.”37 With this simple gesture of protest, Kaepernick “transformed a
collective ritual . . . into something somber, a reminder of how far we still have to go
to realize the high ideal of equal protection under the law that the flag represents.”38
One teacher thanked the football player for “inspiring kids” after six of his students
“took a knee” during the Pledge of Allegiance.39 After the on-camera murder of
George Floyd by police40 and the explosion of Black Lives Matter protests
nationwide during June 2020,41 students are expressing their commitment to
antiracism by kneeling during patriotic exercises.42
School administrators and teachers are fully aware of the racial justice message
conveyed by abstaining from patriotic exercises. Whether it is the school secretary

36. John Branch, The Awakening of Colin Kaepernick, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/sports/colin-kaepernick-nfl-protests.html
[https://perma.cc/968R-U6RX].
37. Wyche, supra note 35 (quoting Kaeperick); see also John Mullin, 49ers QB Colin
Kaepernick: Anthem Protest About ‘Change,’ Not Just Police Violence, NBC SPORTS CHI.
(Nov. 30, 2016, 4:18 PM), https://www.nbcsports.com/chicago/chicago-bears/49ers-qb-colinkaepernick-anthem-protest-about-change-not-just-police-violence [https://perma.cc/H9P3CM8Z] (“I’ve been very clear from the beginning that I’m against systematic oppression. . . .
Police violence is just one of the symptoms of that oppression. For me that is something that
needs to be addressed but it’s not the whole issue.”).
38. Jeremy Adam Smith & Dacher Keltner, The Psychology of Taking a Knee, SCI. AM.
(Sept. 29, 2017), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/voices/the-psychology-of-taking-aknee/ [https://perma.cc/4J9K-QR65].
39. Jay Michaelson, Mini-Kaepernicks Sit Out the Pledge of Allegiance—but Not All
Teachers Know the Law, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 13, 2017, 2:52 PM),
https://www.thedailybeast.com/mini-kaepernicks-sit-out-the-pledge-of-allegiancebut-not-allteachers-know-the-law?ref=scroll [https://perma.cc/EJB5-75HP].
40. Police Officer Derek Chauvin was filmed pressing his knee into Floyd’s neck for over
eight minutes, even after Floyd begged him to stop because he could not breathe. Josh
Campbell, Sara Sidner & Eric Levenson, All Four Former Officers Involved in George Floyd’s
Killing Now Face Charges, CNN (June 4, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/03/us/georgefloyd-officers-charges/index.html [https://perma.cc/W799-V977]. He has been found guilty of
second-degree murder. Laurel Wamsley, Derek Chauvin Found Guilty of George Floyd’s
Murder, NPR (Apr. 20, 2021), https://www.npr.org/sections/trial-over-killing-of-georgefloyd/2021/04/20/987777911/court-says-jury-has-reached-verdict-in-derek-chauvinsmurder-trial [https://perma.cc/4LQK-ZD84].
41. Janie Haseman, Karina Zaiets & Mitchell Thorson, Tracking Protests Across the USA
in the Wake of George Floyd’s Death, USA TODAY (June 4, 2020, 1:31 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/graphics/2020/06/03/map-protests-wake-george-floydsdeath/5310149002/ [https://perma.cc/R2J4-CNR4] (noting that as of June 4, 2020, there have
been protests in at least 430 towns and cities in all fifty states).
42. Cf. Kurt Streeter, Kneeling Fiercely Debated in the N.F.L., Resonates in Protests,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/05/sports/football/georgefloyd-kaepernick-kneeling-nfl-protests.html [https://perma.cc/F4U5-2RLL] (“Within a week
of Floyd’s death, kneeling became a common gesture.”).
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telling a protesting student that “this is not the NFL”43 or a teacher complaining that
students who refuse to honor the flag are as immature as “some pampered arrogant
celebrities and athletes,”44 the gesture is well understood. Indeed, “taking a knee”
has become widespread including among celebrities and athletes45 and a defining
symbol among those protesting police violence against black Americans.46
In short, a law that demands recitation of the pledge also means it demands
affirmation of some viewpoints over others—a compulsion anathema to free speech.
In a famous passage, the Supreme Court declared, “If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”47 Notably, it was a state
law mandating that public-school children recite the pledge that provoked this rebuke
to state-mandated orthodoxy.
Challenges to these laws should easily win. The Supreme Court has already ruled
that it violates the First Amendment to force children to recite the Pledge of
Allegiance. Even if the parental permission version of the law is not exactly the same,
it is still viewpoint-based, and viewpoint-based laws are subject to the most rigorous
scrutiny. Moreover, it is a scrutiny they rarely survive, as little generates more
suspicion than government attempts to censor or chill an unpopular viewpoint.
Nonetheless, content-based speech regulations occasionally survive strict scrutiny
when they advance another constitutional right,48 and Florida and Texas claim that
the parental permission laws promote parents’ constitutional right to control the
upbringing of their children. Moreover, minors’ speech rights, never coextensive

43. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
44. Jenna Lyons, Florida Teacher Removed After Viral Whiteboard Rant Against
Students Who Don’t Stand for the Pledge, ORLANDO WKLY. (Aug. 16, 2019, 11:03 AM),
https://www.orlandoweekly.com/Blogs/archives/2019/08/16/florida-teacher-removed-afterviral-whiteboard-rant-against-students-who-dont-stand-for-the-pledge
[https://perma.cc/CD39-UNUT].
45. Some of the athletes who have followed the example of Colin Kaepernick include
football players from the Tampa Bay Buccaneers, Miami Dolphins, Jacksonville Jaguars,
Indianapolis Colts, Baltimore Ravens, Atlanta Falcons, Detroit Lions, Washington
Commanders, New England Patriots, New York Giants, Cleveland Browns, San Diego
Chargers, Green Bay Packers, Denver Broncos, Buffalo Bills, and Kansas City Chiefs, as well
as the entire Dallas Cowboys team. Stanley Kay, Every NFL Player Who Has Protested
During the National Anthem This Season, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 22, 2017),
https://www.si.com/nfl/2017/08/22/national-anthem-protests-list-players-kneel.
[https://perma.cc/32MF-KDYY]. Famous actors and singers who have “taken a knee” include
Stevie Wonder, John Legend, Pharrell Williams, Tracie Ellis Ross, Uzo Aduba, Shonda
Rhimes and the cast of Gray’s Anatomy. US Celebrities #TakeAKnee in Support of NFL
Protestors, BBC (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/newsbeat-41415060
[https://perma.cc/3VX5-H5PE].
46. Taking a Knee: Athletes Protest Against Racism Around the World—In Pictures,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/sport/gallery/2020/aug/27/nbastrike-athletes-kneeling-black-lives-matter-protest [https://perma.cc/HL74-PGAT].
47. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
48. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (upholding viewpoint-based speech
restriction in order to promote the right to vote).
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with adults, are even more curbed at school. The next two Sections will explain why
neither the lesser rights of students nor the constitutional rights of parents justify
these laws.
II. MINORS’ SPEECH RIGHTS
The Constitution protects both adults and minors. However, minors’ rights are not
the same as adults’, and several Supreme Court cases have particularly curtailed
students’ speech rights at public schools. Nevertheless, none of those limits apply in
this case.
A. Minor Rights Generally
It has long been settled that the Constitution protects everyone, including
children.49 “Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only
when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are
protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.”50
At the same time, the constitutional rights of minors are not coextensive with the
rights of adults.51 Minors are, by definition, immature and therefore presumed to need
advice when making major decisions.52 For example, while minors have bodily
autonomy rights, they need parental permission to undergo surgery.53 When the
stakes are high, and the decisionmaker is young, guidance is deemed necessary. “The
State has a strong and legitimate interest in the welfare of its young citizens, whose
immaturity, inexperience, and lack of judgment may sometimes impair their ability
to exercise their rights wisely.”54
However, that need for adult supervision has less force with free speech, as
exercising that right rarely results in any life-altering consequences in the way that
something like surgery might. Thus, at least with respect to free speech generally,
minors enjoy the same level of protection as adults.
There is one doctrinal caveat: minors may not buy sexually explicit materials
legally available to adults.55 Or more specifically, laws banning the sale to minors
are subject only to an easily satisfied rational basis scrutiny.56 The restriction dates

49. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (“[W]hatever may be their precise impact, neither
the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.”).
50. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
51. Id. (“The Court indeed, however, long has recognized that the State has somewhat
broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults.”).
52. Charlene Simmons, Protecting Children While Silencing Them: The Children's
Online Privacy Protection Act and Children’s Free Speech Rights, 12 COMMC’N. L. & POL’Y
119, 134 (2007) (“While the Court has acknowledged that children have constitutional rights,
it has also recognized that children lack the maturity to make certain decisions.”).
53. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 444–45 (1990).
54. Id. at 444 (justifying need for parental consent).
55. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637 (1968) (“We conclude that we cannot say
that the statute [banning sale of ‘girlie magazines’ to minors] invades the area of freedom of
expression constitutionally secured to minors.”).
56. Id. at 643 (“We therefore cannot say that § 484–h, in defining the obscenity of material
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to an earlier era, when such materials were known as “girlie magazines,”57 and the
danger posed by these magazines was mostly undisputed. Although the Supreme
Court is not on course to overrule this arguably paternalistic rule, it is unlikely to
expand it.
On the contrary, the Court has declined to allow special limits on minors’ access
to explicitly violent materials, such as extremely violent video games.58 According
to the Supreme Court, such a restriction is subject to strict scrutiny,59 and in the case
before it, the state failed to offer sufficient evidence that access to these games causes
harm.60 Without concrete proof of harm, minors’ free speech rights should prevail.
B. Minors’ Speech Rights in School
The calculus is a bit different in public schools.61 Students, without question, have
free speech rights, as the Barnette pledge case made clear in 1943. Yet Supreme
Court decisions since then have imposed various limits on those rights. Still, none
justify anything less than strict scrutiny for Florida’s and Texas’s pledge laws.
The default assumption is that students’ free speech rights at school are fully
protected.62 As the Supreme Court famously proclaimed in Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District, where students silently protested the
Vietnam War by wearing black armbands,63 students do not “shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”64 In fact, the
Court continued, “This has been the unmistakable holding of this Court for almost
50 years.”65
At the same time, the Tinker Court observed schools must be able to accomplish
their educational mission, justifying two limits on its rights-wielding students.

on the basis of its appeal to minors under 17, has no rational relation to the objective of
safeguarding such minors from harm.”).
57. Id. at 631.
58. Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 794–95 (2011) (“No doubt a State
possesses legitimate power to protect children from harm, Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640–641;
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944), but that does not include a free-floating
power to restrict the ideas to which children may be exposed.”).
59. Id. at 799.
60. Id. (“California . . . cannot show a direct causal link between violent video games and
harm to minors.”).
61. Note that these limits apply to students’ school-based speech. They do not apply to
speech outside the public-school context. For example, the Supreme Court has held that school
authorities could not discipline a disappointed cheerleader’s off-campus, expletive-filled rant
on Snapchat: “Geographically speaking, off-campus speech will normally fall within the zone
of parental, rather than school-related, responsibility.” Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B. L., 141
S. Ct. 2038, 2046 (2021).
62. This argument is limited to students at public schools. The Free Speech Clause does
not protect students in private schools. Public schools are state actors; private schools are not.
63. 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969) (“The group determined to publicize their objections to the
hostilities in Vietnam and their support for a truce by wearing black armbands.”).
64. Id. at 506.
65. Id.
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Specifically, students’ right to free speech does not extend to interfering with the
rights of other students nor to substantially disrupting class or school.66
Like the Tinker armbands, a silent, passive protest against the pledge does neither.
Quietly sitting does not interfere with any classmate’s rights, whether it be that
classmate’s free speech right to pledge themselves, their right to equal treatment, or
their right to learn. Quietly sitting does not disrupt any classroom instruction, either.
Although school administrators might argue that a protester’s iconoclastic stance
might upset others and lead to upheaval, Tinker precludes this ground for
punishment. According to Tinker, the fear of possible disruption is not a reason to
violate a student’s rights.67 After pointing out that any unconventional opinion may
provoke argument,68 the Tinker Court insists that this is an inevitable and necessary
risk in a free society with a robust exchange of ideas: “But our Constitution says we
must take this risk and our history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom . . .
that is the basis of our national strength and of the independence and vigor of
Americans who grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often disputatious,
society.”69
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have further curbed students’ free speech
rights, but none in a way applicable to students sitting out the daily Pledge of
Allegiance. The Supreme Court condoned editorial control over school newspapers
when the newspaper’s content might be attributed to the school.70 In particular, the
school worried about age-inappropriate articles such as a story on student
pregnancy.71 But besides the lack of age-inappropriate content in students’ silence,

66. Id. at 509 (protecting students’ speech because it did not “substantially interfere with
the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students”).
67. Id. at 508 (“[I]n our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is
not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.”).
68. Id. (“Any variation from the majority’s opinion may inspire fear. Any word spoken,
in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the views of another person
may start an argument or cause a disturbance.”).
69. Id. at 508–09. In reality, most of the disruptions that have followed a student’s refusal
to join the daily recitation of the pledge is the fault of hostile teachers. Instead of letting
students quietly sit, these teachers overreact and needlessly escalate the situation. Teachers
have harshly upbraided students, and some have even tried to physically force compliance.
E.g., Kristine Phillips, Florida Sixth-Grader Arrested After Dispute with Teacher over Pledge
of Allegiance, WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
education/2019/02/17/florida-sixth-grader-charged-with-misdemeanor-after-refusing-recitepledge-allegiance/ [https://perma.cc/5VQV-FUWP] (recounting how a teacher argued with
the eleven-year-old, telling him if the United States was so bad, he should move somewhere
else); Mitchell Byars, Colorado Teacher Pleads Guilty to Child Abuse After Forcing Student
to Stand for Pledge of Allegiance, DENVER POST (Aug. 31, 2018, 8:07 AM),
https://www.denverpost.com/2018/08/31/karen-smith-teacher-pledge-allegiance/.
70. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271–73 (1988) (describing school
paper as “bear[ing] the imprimatur of the school” and holding that “[e]ducators do not offend
the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related
to legitimate pedagogical concerns”).
71. Id. at 263 (1988) (“[The principal] believed that the article’s references to sexual
activity and birth control were inappropriate for some of the younger students at the school.”).
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there is no risk of misattribution in pledge cases, as no one would confuse the
student’s speech for the school’s.
The Supreme Court has also allowed schools to discipline students for bawdy
innuendos72 made during a school assembly.73 That is, “the First Amendment gives
a high school student [] the right to wear Tinker's armband, but not Cohen’s [Fuck
the Draft] jacket.”74 But lewd jokes about a “firm in his pants” fellow student who
“pounds” his “point” until the very end has little in common with a decision not to
participate in the Pledge of Allegiance.75
Finally, the Supreme Court has permitted schools to punish students for speech
that advocates illegal drug use.76 In Morse v. Frederick,77 during a school-sponsored
excursion to watch the Olympic torch relay, a student unfurled a fourteen-foot banner
proclaiming “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”78 The principal argued that the phrase, which
the student described as a bit of nonsense,79 could be read as encouraging or
celebrating marijuana use.80 The Supreme Court held that given the grave threat that
drugs posed to student health,81 school authorities had a compelling reason to ban the
promotion of drugs at school.82 Because a failure to pledge cannot by any stretch of
the imagination be interpreted as advocating any dangerous behavior, never mind
drugs, the Morse v. Frederick limits are as inapposite as the others.

He also claimed he worried that the details of that story, as well as the details in a story on the
impact of divorce, would allow readers to identify the students whose names were not
revealed. Id.
72. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677–78 (1986) (“During the entire
speech, Fraser referred to his candidate in terms of an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual
metaphor.”).
73. Id. at 685–86 (1986) (“The First Amendment does not prevent the school officials
from determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such as respondent’s would
undermine the school’s basic educational mission.”).
74. Id. at 682 (internal citation omitted) (Newman, J., concurring). While Tinker protested
the Vietnam War with a black armband, Cohen protested it with a jacket that read, “Fuck the
Draft.”
75. The student was endorsing a classmate for vice president. His speech included the
following statement: “I know a man who is firm—he’s firm in his pants, . . . who takes his
point and pounds it in. If necessary, he’ll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn’t attack
things in spurts—he drives hard, pushing and pushing until finally—he succeeds. Jeff is a man
who will go to the very end—even the climax, for each and every one of you. So vote for Jeff
for A.S.B. vice-president.” Id. at 687 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
76. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007) (“[W]e hold that schools may take steps
to safeguard those entrusted to their care from speech that can reasonably be regarded as
encouraging illegal drug use.”).
77. Id. at 396.
78. Id. at 397.
79. Id. at 401 (“Frederick himself claimed ‘that the words were just nonsense meant to
attract television cameras.’”).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 407 (“Drug abuse can cause severe and permanent damage to the health and
well-being of young people.”).
82. Id. at 410 (“The First Amendment does not require schools to tolerate at school events
student expression that contributes to th[e] dangers [of illegal drug use].”).
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Doctrinally, then, as a viewpoint-based regulation, the pledge requirement ought
to trigger strict scrutiny. While some regulations of student speech avoid this
rigorous scrutiny, the pledge requirement does not fall into any of the recognized
exceptions: remaining silent during the Pledge of Allegiance neither interferes with
other students’ rights nor disrupts the school (Tinker); it is not attributable to the
school (Hazelwood); and it cannot be characterized as lewd (Bethel) or drugpromoting (Morse). Thus, none of the accepted justifications for regulating school
speech apply. On the contrary, all of the recognized harms of compelled speech are
realized when schools force students to recite the Pledge of Allegiance unless their
parents excuse them.
III. FREE SPEECH HARMS OF COMPELLED PLEDGE
A closer look reveals that all the recognized harms of compelled speech are
present when students are forced to recite the pledge. To understand why compelled
speech undermines the Free Speech Clause, it is necessary to understand why the
First Amendment protects speech in the first place. The three most prominent reasons
for constitutional protection of speech are (1) to promote a robust marketplace of
ideas; (2) to enable participatory democracy; and (3) to foster individual autonomy,
self-expression, and self-realization.83 Finally, distrust of government, while not
technically a value or goal, is a consistent theme running through free speech
jurisprudence.84 Just as free speech can help realize these goals, compelled speech
can compromise them.85
A. Marketplace of Ideas
The purpose of a marketplace of ideas is to ensure that listeners have access to the
widest possible array of knowledge, ideas, and opinions.86 Exposure to wide-ranging
information ensures that listeners can make their own informed decisions. Or to put
it another way, to control what an audience hears may unduly influence their views—
views they might not hold with access to more complete information and more varied
opinions.
Compelling students to recite the pledge distorts the marketplace of ideas
available for students at school.87 Students who want to join the pledge still can, even

83. Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1277, 1291 (2014).
84. FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 85–86 (1982).
85. Corbin, supra note 83, at 1293.
86. The phrase itself originates in a Justice Holmes dissent: Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached
by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market . . . . That at any rate is the theory of our
Constitution.”).
87. Cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969) (“‘The
vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of
American schools.’ The classroom is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’ The Nation's future
depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which
discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative
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if their parents would prefer they do not. Students who do not want to pledge must,
unless their parents consent to their abstention. Parents may deny permission for
different reasons. They may disagree with their child’s opinion on the matter. Or
parents may actually agree with their child’s views but fear the repercussions of
dissent;88 whether more realistic or more fearful, adults may be less willing to make
waves. The bottom line is that the school’s rule will decrease the odds that any one
child will have a classmate who sits out or takes a knee during the Pledge of
Allegiance. Instead, almost everyone, including classmates who oppose it, will stand
and pledge.
The end result is a less robust marketplace of ideas for the students at school.
Moreover, the school has tilted the debate in favor of its own viewpoint. This is
especially true if students misinterpret participation in the pledge as support for all
that it represents. That is, “if government forces speakers to convey an opinion they
disagree with, and if an audience believes that the message is the private speakers’
rather than the government’s, the audience may erroneously conclude that the
message is more widespread than it really is.”89 Moreover, the perceived popularity
of a message, studies show, will increase its persuasiveness.90 While we are all
susceptible to this type of cognitive error, school children may be especially so. In
short, the government uses its coercive power to persuade, not by virtue of the
underlying worthiness of its message, but by controlling the messages that students
are exposed to. This is not how the marketplace of ideas is supposed to work.
Some might argue that this is how school is supposed to work, and that the
marketplace of ideas in school should be more circumscribed than the general
marketplace. Granted, because schools have a responsibility to teach certain rules of
civil discourse,91 perhaps certain means of engagement should be discouraged, such
as inflicting crude sexual innuendo on a captive audience.92 But silent protest is not
one of them. Perhaps certain subjects and even certain viewpoints should be off limits

selection.’” (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. Of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting))).
88. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 208–09 n.3 (1963)
(explaining that parents challenging mandatory Bible readings initially did not seek to excuse
children for fear they “would be ‘labeled as “odd balls”’ before their teachers and classmates
every school day,” that “they would have to stand in the hall outside their ‘homeroom,’ and
that this carried with it the imputation of punishment for bad conduct”).
89. Corbin, supra note 83, at 1295.
90. See Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and
Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 668–69 (2008); Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency,
and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983, 1010 (2005) (“The phenomenon of popular
influence is well-established in the social science literature, which shows that ideas perceived
to have achieved broad acceptance are generally more persuasive.”); see also id. at 1011–13
(citing studies).
91. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (“The undoubted freedom to
advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and classrooms must be balanced
against the society’s countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially
appropriate behavior.”).
92. Id. at 683 (“Surely it is a highly appropriate function of public school education to
prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse.”).

366027-ILJ 97-3_Text.indd 184

5/5/22 2:59 PM

2022]

REQUIRING PARENTAL CONSENT

981

in school, such as glamorizing illegal drug use.93 Again, however, religious liberty
and racial justice are not among them.94
On the contrary, “the objectives of public education [are] the ‘inculcat[ion of]
fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political
system.’”95 Nothing is more fundamental to a democracy than basic liberties like
freedom of religion, and nothing embodies American ideals more than equality for
everyone, regardless of race. Yet, instead of fostering inquiry and training thoughtful
future citizens, the compulsory pledge does just the opposite. And it does it by
distorting the marketplace of ideas, thereby impeding students’ search for truth and
knowledge.
B. Democratic Self-Governance
The second reason the Constitution protects free speech is to facilitate democratic
self-rule.96 In order for our democracy “of the people, by the people, for the people”97
to work, the people need the opportunity to shape political debate and the knowledge
to make informed political decisions.98 Denying students the right to sit out the
pledge interferes with both these mechanisms of political speech.
At a minimum, this denial prevents students from articulating their political
views. Part of what makes the United States a democracy is not just that everyone
gets to vote for policymakers, but that everyone gets to opine on what the policies
should be.99 As Robert Post argues, “the ability of individual citizens to participate
in the formation of public opinion” is crucial to democratic self-determination.100

93. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007) (“It was reasonable for [the school
principal] to conclude that the banner promoted illegal drug use . . . and that failing to act
would send a powerful message to the students in her charge, including Frederick, about how
serious the school was about the dangers of illegal drug use.”); id. at 408 (“The ‘special
characteristics of the school environment,’ and the governmental interest in stopping student
drug abuse . . . allow schools to restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as
promoting illegal drug use.”).
94. Indeed, white supremacy has persisted for so long in part because it has not been
acknowledged and discussed.
95. Bethel Sch. Dist., 478 U.S. at 681.
96. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF
THE PEOPLE 27 (1965) (“The principle of the freedom of speech springs from the necessities
of the program of self-government. . . . It is a deduction from the basic American agreement
that public issues shall be decided by universal suffrage.”).
97. Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19,
1863).
98. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982) (“[T]he First
Amendment serves to ensure that the individual citizen can effectively participate in and
contribute to our republican system of self-government.”); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318
(1988) (“We have recognized that the First Amendment reflects a ‘profound national
commitment’ to the principle that ‘debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open,’ and have consistently commented on the central importance of protecting speech
on public issues.”) (citations omitted).
99. Corbin, supra note 83, at 1293.
100. Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88
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As discussed above, sitting out or taking a knee during the daily Pledge of
Allegiance is often politically motivated.101 It may be how students demonstrate their
support for wider political movements, such as Black Lives Matter. In the aftermath
of George Floyd’s murder, taking the knee may not only represent a demand for
social justice but also serve as a reminder of the method by which yet another black
body was rendered lifeless.102 To deny students the chance to convey this symbolic
message is to deny them full democratic participation,103 thereby frustrating rather
than facilitating students’ ability to contribute to the political discourse.
At the same time, removing this message from the political marketplace of ideas
at school inhibits students from becoming fully informed on important social and
political questions—and the issue of racism is of paramount importance in the United
States.104 Participatory democracy suffers because citizens need exposure to a wide
range of views in order to vote wisely.105 As James Madison wrote, “[A] people who
mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power knowledge
gives.”106
In short, instead of cultivating political debate among students, the school is
essentially trying to eliminate a viewpoint from the discussion. Yet, as the Tinker
Court noted, children “may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that
which the State chooses to communicate.”107 Public schools are supposed to help
students develop the skills they need to become active participants in our
democracy.108 Stifling dissent is contrary to this core mission of public education. To
repeat the Barnette Court: “That [schools] are educating the young for citizenship is
reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we

CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2368 (2000).
101. Ben Riley-Smith, ‘Take a Knee’: How a Quarterback’s Simple Gesture Became the
(June 3,
2020,
9:21 PM),
US Protests’
Rallying Cry,
TELEGRAPH
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/06/03/take-knee-quarterbacks-simple-gesturebecame-us-protests-rallying/ [https://perma.cc/62XY-CLEN].
102. Streeter, supra note 42.
103. Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 35 (2004) (“What makes a
culture democratic . . . is not democratic governance but democratic participation.”) (emphasis
omitted).
104. The long-standing problem of racism in the United States should not need a footnote.
105. Cf. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
25 (1948) (“What is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying
shall be said.”). This free flow of knowledge and opinions is essential in order for citizens to
vote wisely. Id. (urging that “all facts and interests relevant to the problem shall be fully and
fairly presented [so] that all the alternative lines of action can be wisely measured in relation
to one another”).
106. Letter from James Madison to W. T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/
v1ch18s35.html [https://perma.cc/NW35-9CAQ].
107. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
108. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979) (“The importance of public schools in
the preparation of individuals for participation as citizens, and in the preservation of the values
on which our society rests, long has been recognized by our decisions.”).

366027-ILJ 97-3_Text.indd 186

5/5/22 2:59 PM

2022]

REQUIRING PARENTAL CONSENT

983

are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important
principles of our government as mere platitudes.”109
Moreover, it is not just any viewpoint the state is hoping to chill. It is one critical
of the government, and it is one the government has criticized.110 Comments like
those spouted by a U.S. Senator from Texas—“I, for one, am not a fan of rich, spoiled
athletes disrespecting the flag”111—or by a U.S. Representative from Florida—“I’d
rather the US not have a soccer team than have a soccer team that won’t stand for the
National Anthem”112—are far from uncommon.113 Of course, the athletes were trying
to use their privileged position to spotlight racial inequality, including racial violence
by the government.114 Kaepernick’s own protests were sparked by the police
shooting of a young black man,115 one of many such deaths across the country.116

109. W. Va. State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
110. AP, Trump Says N.F.L. Players Should be Fired for Anthem Protests, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/23/sports/trump-nfl-colin-kaepernick.html [https://perma.cc/LM46-V3U8]; see also Bryan Armen Graham, Donald Trump Blasts
NFL Anthem Protesters: ‘Get that Son of a Bitch Off the Field,’ GUARDIAN (Sept. 23, 2017,
6:43
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2017/sep/22/donald-trump-nfl-nationalanthem-protests.
111. Matthew Choi, Texas Officials Criticize NFL Players Over National Anthem Protests,
TEX. TRIB. (Sept. 25, 2017, 8:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2017/09/25/texasrepublicans-criticize-nfl-players-national-anthem/ [https://perma.cc/RSW8-X6UE] (quoting
Sen. Ted Cruz).
112. Andrew Blake, Matt Gaetz Threatens U.S. Soccer with ‘Financial Repercussions’ If
13,
2020),
Athletes
Don’t
Stand
for
Anthem,
WASH. TIMES (Jun.
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/jun/13/matt-gaetz-threatens-us-soccer-withfinancial-repe/ [https://perma.cc/DQ6H-637T] (quoting Rep. Matt Gaetz).
113. Matt Dixon, Leading Florida Republicans Side with Trump in Feud with NFL,
POLITICO (Sept. 25, 2017, 5:02 AM), https://www.politico.com/states/florida/story/
2017/09/24/leading-florida-republicans-side-with-trump-in-feud-with-nfl-114680
[https://perma.cc/48ZH-FSNN]; see also Choi, supra note 111.
114. Amina Khan, Getting Killed by Police is a Leading Cause of Death for Young Black
Men in America, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/science/story/201908-15/police-shootings-are-a-leading-cause-of-death-for-black-men (summarizing study that
police are two and a half times more likely to kill black men and boys than white ones, and
that “about 1 in 1,000 black men and boys in America can expect to die at the hands of the
police”);
Mapping
Police
Violence,
https://mappingpoliceviolence.org/
[https://perma.cc/M8XG-BPPY] (providing statistics on police shootings); Rob Picheta &
Henrik Pettersson, American Police Shoot, Kill and Imprison More People than Other
Developed Nations. Here’s the Data, CNN (June 8, 2020, 7:13 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/08/us/us-police-floyd-protests-country-comparisonsintl/index.html [https://perma.cc/3FBC-37VH] (reporting that U.S. police are at least thirty
times more likely to shoot people compared to European nations, and that U.S. police are
almost four times as likely to use force on black as opposed to white people).
115. David K. Li, Colin Kaepernick Reveals the Specific Police Shooting that Led Him to
Kneel, NBC NEWS (Aug. 20, 2019, 11:36 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/colin-kaepernick-reveals-specific-police-shooting-led-him-kneel-n1044306
[https://perma.cc/A6MR-SWU2].
116. Killings that have resulted in protests include Eric Garner (choked to death despite
repeatedly saying “I can’t breathe” in 2014); Michael Brown (killed in Ferguson, Missouri
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In short, patriotic exercises are a site of resistance to the government and a
student’s refusal to join the pledge is often intended as a rebuke of the government.
A hallmark of democracy is the right to criticize the government—a right the public
schools are effectively denying when they preclude the student’s silent political
protest.117 Not only is it contrary to democratic values, it also stymies democratic
accountability: how can citizens vote for new politicians and new policies if they are
ill-informed about the current ones?118
To be sure, most students in public school are not yet old enough to vote. But they
will be soon enough. As the Seventh Circuit observed: “Now that eighteen-year-olds
have the right to vote, it is obvious that they must be allowed the freedom to form
their political views on the basis of uncensored speech before they turn eighteen, so
that their minds are not a blank when they first exercise the franchise.”119 And again,
schools are supposed to prepare the next generation for their civic duties, which
includes contributing to the political discourse and making political decisions at
election time. “America’s public schools are the nurseries of democracy,”120 yet the
pledge law denies both student speakers their right to weigh in on the political
debates of the day and the student audience their right to hear a wide range of views
to help inform their own thinking.

after being accused of stealing a box of cigars in 2014); Tamir Rice (twelve-year-old boy with
toy gun in open carry state shot in 2014); Walter Scott (shot in the back five times in 2015);
Alton Sterling (killed during struggle for selling homemade CDs in 2016); Philando Castile
(shot while reaching for ID during traffic stop in 2016); Stephon Clark (shot in grandmother’s
backyard by police investigating nearby break-in in 2018); Breonna Taylor (shot in her own
apartment during botched raid in the middle of the night in 2020); George Floyd (2020);
Daunte Wright (shot by officer who says had meant to use taser in 2021). George Floyd:
Timeline of Black Deaths and Protests, BBC NEWS (April 22, 2021),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52905408 [https://perma.cc/WNT4-M9R2]; see
generally, Cheryl W. Thompson, Fatal Police Shootings of Unarmed Black People Reveal
Troubling Patterns, NPR (Jan. 25, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/01/25/956177021/fatalpolice-shootings-of-unarmed-black-people-reveal-troubling-patterns
[https://perma.cc/AKM8-WK4A]; Fatal Police Shootings of Unarmed Black People in US
More than Three Times as High as in Whites, BMJ (Oct. 27, 2020),
https://www.bmj.com/company/newsroom/fatal-police-shootings-of-unarmed-black-peoplein-us-more-than-3-times-as-high-as-in-whites/ [https://perma.cc/E2NQ-4JE2].
117. Cf. W. Va. State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943) (“Those who begin
coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory
unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard.”).
118. Cf. Alan K. Chen, Forced Patriot Acts, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 703, 707 (2004)
(“Electoral upheaval is unlikely where false perceptions of uniform public satisfaction are
pervasive.”).
119. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2001).
120. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B. L., 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2046 (2021).
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C. Autonomy
The value of free speech to individual autonomy121—the third rationale—is the
one that most directly relies on the inherent dignity of human beings.122 Rather than
view speech instrumentally as a means to help us gain knowledge or govern our
nation, the autonomy rationale views speech as an end in itself. Speech is how people
express themselves—their inner thoughts, their passionate beliefs—which is an
inherent good. Constitutional protection for free speech promotes speaker autonomy
by ensuring that the individual rather than the government controls what they say and
what they think.123
Forcing students to stand and recite the pledge with their hand over their heart,
however, insults individual autonomy.124 Not only is the government forcing students
to speak when they would rather stay silent, it commandeers students own bodies to
do so.125 This disregard of autonomy is exacerbated when the government’s message
is contrary to one’s own beliefs.126 For religious objectors, the pledge may actually
violate religious beliefs. For Black Lives Matter supporters, it replaces the student’s
own message with the government’s. It should be self-evident that forcing someone
to deliver the government's message intrudes on their sense of self. Students
obviously cannot be considered autonomous in thought or speech if forced to express
viewpoints anathema to them.127 Finally, “[t]his insult to the speaker’s dignity is
compounded if listeners misattribute the government’s opinion to the speaker.”128 Of

121. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Harm, Liberty, and Free Speech, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 979,
980 (1997) (“Speech can relate to autonomy in two ways: as itself an exercise of autonomy or
as an informational resource arguably essential for meaningful exercise of autonomy.”).
122. Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1423 (2000) (“From Kant to Rawls, a central strand of Western
philosophical tradition emphasizes respect for the fundamental dignity of persons.”).
123. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234–35 (1977) (“[A]t the heart of the
First Amendment is the notion . . . that in a free society one’s beliefs should be shaped by his
mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State.”).
124. Compelled speech may, for various reasons, also insult the autonomy of audiences,
but for this Essay, I will focus on the speaker. See Corbin, supra note 83, at 1300 (“A very
strong strain of anti-paternalism underlies our free speech jurisprudence.”). See generally id.
at 1300–08.
125. Corbin, supra note 83, at 1299 (“For the speaker, this loss of autonomy becomes
particularly grating when the government commandeers not only one’s speech, but one’s body
as well.”).
126. Id. (“Compelled speech is doubly offensive when the message represents an opinion
or ideology contrary to one’s own beliefs.”).
127. Seana Shiffrin takes the argument one step further and argues that daily recitation of
the pledge might actually influence the “autonomous thinking process[es]” of the compelled
students. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, What is Really Wrong with Compelled Association?, 99
NW. U. L. REV. 839, 840 (2005); see also id. at 859 (“[C]ompelled speech may come to exert
an influence on the thoughts (and actions) of the speaker in a way that surreptitiously bypasses
the agent’s conscious consideration and does not reflect her sincere deliberation about the
matter.”).
128. Corbin, supra note 83, at 1298.
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course, even if no one misunderstands the speaker’s personal views, being forced to
parrot the state’s ideological message is still an insult to personal autonomy.
It is true that students’ autonomy vis-à-vis speech is regularly curtailed in school.
Students cannot chime in at will in the middle of class. They must write essays on
designated topics. But these examples of silencing or compelling speech are directly
linked to basic pedagogical goals. They are necessary to the business of teaching.
Mandating the Pledge of Allegiance is not. As a matter of education, a school might
require an essay on the meaning or history of the pledge, but that is distinct from
requiring students to actually participate in it. And while the school might want to
encourage patriotism, it cannot dictate it. As the Supreme Court noted in another case
involving the American flag, “a government cannot mandate by fiat a feeling of unity
in its citizens.”129
In short, a regulatory scheme that forces unwilling students to pledge allegiance,
including students who would rather make a political statement by abstaining,
embodies all the harms of compelled speech: it diminishes the marketplace of ideas
at school; it silences a powerful criticism of the government; and it insults the
autonomy of the compelled student. Because viewpoint-based speech regulations
often cause these harms, they are presumptively unconstitutional.130 At a minimum
they are subject to strict scrutiny, which requires that the law be narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling government interest.131 What government interest could
possibly justify this trampling of students’ free speech rights? According to the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, it is a parent’s constitutional right to control the
upbringing of their children.132
IV. PARENTS’ SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
It is the rare free speech regulation that survives strict scrutiny,133 and the Supreme
Court regularly describes speech regulations triggering strict scrutiny as
presumptively unconstitutional.134 When a regulation does survive, it is often
because the regulation is promoting another constitutional right, such as the right to
vote.135 Perhaps a law advancing parents’ substantive due process right to control the

129. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 401 (1989) (internal quotation omitted).
130. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995)
(“[I]deologically driven attempts to suppress a particular point of view are presumptively
unconstitutional.”).
131. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015) (“Content-based laws . . . are
presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they
are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.”).
132. Frazier ex rel. Frazier v. Winn, 535 F.3d 1279, 1285–86 (11th Cir. 2008).
133. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 444 (2015) (“We have emphasized that ‘it
is the rare case’ in which a State demonstrates that a speech restriction is narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling interest.” (quoting Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (plurality
opinion))).
134. See, e.g., Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2299 (2019) (“[V]iewpoint discrimination
is an ‘egregious form of content discrimination’ and is ‘presumptively unconstitutional.’”
(quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829–30)).
135. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (upholding ban on electioneering within
100 feet of polling place in order to protect integrity of right to vote); cf. Williams-Yulee, 575
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upbringing of their children satisfies these stringent requirements. Certainly the
Eleventh Circuit cited to this right as the state’s compelling interest behind its
parental-consent regulation.136
However, the right fails to justify the pledge laws for at least three reasons. First,
“the right to parent is weaker than the Court’s rhetoric suggests,”137 and it is even
weaker in the public-school context. Second, the right is meant to be a limit on the
state, not on one’s own children. In fact, parents’ right to control their children ends
when harm to their child begins. Third, while parents’ control over some decisions
may be justified on the grounds that their children are too immature to make those
decisions themselves, the free speech decision whether to recite the pledge is not one
of them.
A. Background on Substantive Due Process
Not every right protected by the U.S. Constitution is specifically listed. These
unenumerated rights are currently grounded in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and are known as “substantive due process rights.”138 One
of the earliest substantive due process rights is the right of parents to control the
upbringing of their children.139
The right dates from at least the 1920s,140 when the Supreme Court struck down
laws limiting educational options for schoolchildren in part because they infringed
on the right of parents to direct their children’s education.141 As the Court held,
“Evidently the legislature has attempted materially to interfere . . . with the

U.S. at 448–49 (upholding bar on judicial candidate solicitations to protect integrity of
judiciary). But cf. Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010) (finding that
“combating terrorism is an urgent objective of the highest order”).
136. Frazier ex rel. Frazier v. Winn, 535 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008) (“We see the
statute before us now as largely a parental-rights statute.”).
137. Vivian E. Hamilton, Immature Citizens and the State, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1055, 1086
(2010).
138. The more logical textual basis for unenumerated rights includes the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which states, “No state shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States,” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, or even the Ninth Amendment, which reads, “The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people,” id. amend. IX. However, the Supreme Court eviscerated the
scope of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873),
and the Court has so far proven reluctant to rely on the language of the Ninth Amendment,
despite occasional reference to it. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
139. Hamilton, supra note 137, at 1088 (“The Court reads [Meyer and Pierce] as having
established ‘that the “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right of parents
to “establish a home and bring up children” and . . . “to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control.”’”).
140. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
141. In Meyer, Nebraska barred the teaching of foreign languages in schools before the
eighth grade. 262 U.S. at 397. In Pierce, Oregon required schoolchildren to attend public
school. 268 U.S. at 531.
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opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge, and with the power of parents to
control the education of their own.”142
Like free speech rights, parental rights have both instrumental and intrinsic value.
Instrumentally, parents are given authority to make decisions on behalf of their
children on the assumption that their love for and intimate knowledge of their
children will lead parents to do what is best for them.143 For parents, there is also
inherent value in shaping their children: “[T]he freedom to rear our children
according to the dictates of conscience is for most of us as important as any other
expression of conscience.”144
This parental right has been reaffirmed in modern times. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,145
decided in 1972, the Supreme Court struck down a compulsory education law as
violating Amish parents’ religious and substantive due process rights.146 Wisconsin
required that students stay in school until they were sixteen.147 The Amish parents
wanted their children to pursue vocational education at home instead of remaining in
public schools, where they would be exposed to “worldly influence[s]” antithetical
to Amish values.148 Noting that “[t]his primary role of the parents in the upbringing
of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American
tradition,”149 the Court found for the parents. However compelling the states’
interests in ensuring that students learn enough to fulfill their civic responsibilities
and become economically independent,150 the Court held that staying in public
school until age sixteen was not necessary for Amish students to achieve those
goals.151
The right of parents to control the education and upbringing of their children also
played a role in several Supreme Court cases involving custody and visitation of
children. In Troxel v. Granville,152 parents challenged a state law that allowed anyone
to petition the superior courts for visitation rights and authorized the court to grant
visitation despite objecting parents if the court believed it was in the best interest of
the child.153 In the particular case, the lower courts had awarded to a widowed
mother’s in-laws the right to visit with her very young daughters.154 Although the
Supreme Court did not question the importance of advancing “the best interest of the

142. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401; see also Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–35 (“[W]e think it entirely
plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.”).
143. Hamilton, supra note 137, at 1083, 1085.
144. Id. at 1085 (quoting EAMONN CALLAN, CREATING CITIZENS: POLITICAL EDUCATION
AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 143 (1997)); see also id. at 1081 (“Expressing their identities and
living according to their values usually includes instilling those values in their children and
thus influencing their conceptions of the good life.”).
145. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
146. Id. at 207.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 210–11.
149. Id. at 232.
150. Id. at 221.
151. Id. at 222.
152. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
153. Id. at 60.
154. Id. at 60–61.
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child,” the Court held it could be achieved in a way that better respected parents’
constitutional rights to control their children’s upbringing.155
B. Parental Rights in School
Although well-established, the parental right to control the education and
upbringing of one’s child is not necessarily robust.156 Not only were Meyer and
Pierce decided at the height of the now discredited Lochner era, but also the parental
right was combined with other rights no longer recognized.157 Similarly, Yoder also
included Free Exercise Clause claims. As Vivian Hamilton has argued, “Although
the Court regularly describes the right as fundamental, it has employed something
like true strict scrutiny only in cases where state action has gone so far as to threaten
the existence of the parent-child relationship itself.”158 Even when custody or
visitation is at stake (as opposed to termination), the right on its own no longer
triggers strict scrutiny.159 Outside state interference with custody, the right is weaker
still.160
Moreover, courts always rebuff the claim that parents have a substantive due
process right to control what occurs in public school.161 In Baker v. Owen,162 the

155. Id. at 65–69.
156. Margaret Ryznar, A Curious Parental Right, 71 SMU L. REV. 127, 128 (2018) (“[T]he
Court has not articulated a consistent level of scrutiny for judicial review of restrictions on the
parental right.”); see also id. at 145 (“Adam Winkler has noted in his empirical research that
courts ‘tend to reject another type of substantive due process infringement: restrictions on
parents’ rights to control their children’s upbringing.’”).
157. William G. Ross, The Contemporary Significance of Meyer and Pierce for Parental
Rights Issues Involving Education, 34 AKRON L. REV. 177, 178 (2000) (“Despite their ringing
declarations about human rights, Meyer and Pierce were both formally decided largely on the
basis of property rights—the liberty of the schools to conduct a business, the right of private
school teachers to follow their occupation, and the freedom of the schools and the parents to
enter into contracts.”); Ryznar, supra note 156, at 144 (“First, much of the precedent on the
parental right is a product of its time.”).
158. Hamilton, supra note 137, at 1086.
159. Id.; Elizabeth J. Sher, Choosing for Children: Adjudicating Medical Care Disputes
Between Parents and the State, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 157, 176 (1983) (noting that parental rights
are “most prominent when the state seeks to separate the parents from the child permanently,
terminating parental rights completely”).
160. Cf. Ryznar, supra note 156, at 143 (“[T]he parental right to the care, custody, and
control of a child is too complex for one level of scrutiny.”); id. at 157 (“An undertheorized
reason for the lack of guidance on the appropriate level of scrutiny is that the parental right is
too complex—spanning too many different issues that variously burden the essence of
parenthood—to have one static level of scrutiny.”).
161. Ross, supra note 157, at 188 (“Courts also have rejected parental objections to public
school practices and curriculum even in cases in which parents have relied both on parental
rights and the free exercise of religion.”); Frazier v. Smith, No. 08-1351, 2009 WL 1931582,
at *12 (U.S. July 1, 2009) (“Parents do not have a constitutional right to insist that public
schools teach their children in accordance with the parents’ beliefs, no matter how fervently
and sincerely held.”).
162. 423 U.S. 907 (1975).
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Supreme Court summarily reaffirmed one such decision.163 In particular, a mother
complained that the school’s use of corporal punishment on her sixth-grade son over
her objections violated her substantive due process rights.164 While the lower court
acknowledged that the school’s action implicated the mother’s constitutional right to
choose when and how to discipline her child,165 it did not find this right to be
fundamental;166 instead, it concluded that “We do not read Meyer and Pierce to
enshrine parental rights so high in the hierarchy of constitutional values.”167 The
court then found that the school policy easily survived rational basis scrutiny.168
Lower court decisions have followed suit.169 While acknowledging that Meyer
and Pierce protected parents’ right to choose whether to send their children to public
school, these courts generally conclude that “parents do not have a fundamental
constitutional right to dictate the curriculum at the public school to which they have
chosen to send their children.”170 Thus, courts have rejected challenges to grade
school book selections,171 middle school health education programs,172 and high
school mandatory community service programs.173
Most did not even apply heightened scrutiny. In rejecting one claim, the Fifth
Circuit emphasized that eighty years of precedent dictated no more than rational basis
scrutiny for assertions of parental rights in public schools.174 In short, “[t]he courts
are unwilling to grant parents any general power to select the educational

163. Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C. 1975), aff'd, 423 U.S. 907 (1975).
164. Baker, 395 F. Supp. at 296 (“Mrs. Baker alleges that the administration of corporal
punishment after her objections violated her parental right to determine disciplinary methods
for her child.”). The school had paddled her sixth-grade son multiple times despite her repeated
request that they not hit him. Id. at 295–96.
165. Id. at 299.
166. Id. at 299; see also id. at 300 (“[W]e cannot say that her right of total opposition to
his corporal punishment is fundamental in a constitutional sense.”).
167. Id. at 299.
168. Id. at 296 (“We hold that fourteenth amendment liberty embraces the right of parents
generally to control means of discipline of their children, but that the state has a countervailing
interest in the maintenance of order in the schools, in this case sufficient to sustain the right of
teachers and school officials to administer reasonable corporal punishment for disciplinary
purposes.”).
169. See, e.g., Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2005)
(upholding limited parental access to the classroom and control over school uniforms for their
children).
170. Eric W. Schulze, The Constitutional Right of Parents to Direct the Education of Their
Children, 138 ED. L. REP. 583, 592 (1999) (citing Reid v. Lufkin Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 9:96–
CV–420 (E.D. Tex. August 14, 1998)).
171. Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008).
172. Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Davis v. Page, 385 F.
Supp. 395 (D.N.H. 1974) (“Our system of education could not survive if parents were allowed
to dictate the courses and modes of study.”).
173. Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454 (2d Cir. 1996); In re Herndon v.
Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 1996).
174. Ryznar, supra note 156, at 139 (quoting Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268
F.3d 275, 291 (5th Cir. 2001)).
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requirements with which they will or will not comply, under the rubric of the
constitutional right of parents to direct the education of their children.”175
Notably, such a result was hinted at as far back as Meyer and Pierce. Despite the
language in support of parental rights, the cases made clear that the state retained the
power “to prescribe a curriculum for institutions which it supports,”176 and to
“reasonably [] regulate all schools, [and] to inspect, supervise and examine them,
their teachers and pupils.”177 Parents have the right to choose their children’s school,
but once they opt for public school, they cannot control the curriculum.178
The general weakness of the parental right in the school context, and the fact that
schools generally resist such claims, suggests that Florida’s and Texas’s invocation
of parental rights was a pretext rather than the true motive for the pledge laws. Of
course, even if a constitutional right is not deemed “fundamental,” promoting it may
still be a compelling government interest. Discrimination based on sexual orientation
or gender identity does not trigger strict scrutiny, yet surely the government’s goal
in eradicating any kind of invidious discrimination is compelling. Nevertheless, any
insinuation that the school was required to give parents the power to force their
children to participate in the pledge because of their substantive due process right
cannot stand. Courts have made it quite clear that once children are in school, the
school and not the parents have final authority over their charges, including questions
of discipline and curriculum.
C. Parental Rights Against Children
Another problem with relying on parents’ substantive due process rights to justify
the parental consent law179 is that this right is generally asserted by parents against
the states, not against their own children.180 “Decisions . . . vindicating parental rights
in the context of laws regulating the schooling of children have concerned the rights
of parents who wanted their children free from state compulsion, not the rights of
parents who sought to impose state compulsion on their children.”181 Moreover,

175. Schulze, supra note 170, at 596.
176. Id. at 585 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923)).
177. Id. (quoting Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925)).
178. Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 395 (6th Cir. 2005) (“While
parents may have a fundamental right to decide whether to send their child to a public school,
they do not have a fundamental right generally to direct how a public school teaches their
child.”); Schulze, supra note 170, at 590 (“Although the proper judicial method for analyzing
claims of alleged violations of the parental constitutional right remains in doubt, the reported
court decisions [on parental challenges to school decisions] nevertheless have been remarkably
consistent in rejecting the constitutional claims.”).
179. Frazier ex rel. Frazier v. Winn, 535 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he refusal
of students to participate in the Pledge—unless their parents consent—hinders their parents’
fundamental right to control their children’s upbringing.”).
180. Frazier ex rel. Frazier v. Alexandre, 555 F.3d 1292, 1298 (11th Cir. 2009) (Barkett,
J., dissenting) (“The parental right of upbringing is not a positive right that gives parents the
power to invoke the aid of the State against a minor’s exercise of constitutional rights but a
negative right that provides for protection of that right against the State.”).
181. Brief for Petitioner, Frazier v. Smith, No. 08-1351, 2009 WL 1931582, at *11 (U.S.
July 1, 2019).
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when parents’ preferences and children’s wellbeing obviously conflict, the Supreme
Court favors children’s wellbeing.
In the cases cited above, the parents were challenging an action by the
government, not by their children. In Meyer and Pierce, the parents challenged a law
limiting educational opportunities. In Yoder, the parents challenged a law mandating
educational attendance. In Troxel, the parents were pushing back against state
interference in visitation decisions. None of the cases explicitly involved the states
giving parents power to coercively overrule their children.182
One might argue that the cases assumed that if there were a clash between parents
and children, the parents would prevail despite the contrary wishes of their child.183
Yoder, for example, presented a potential conflict between parents and children. On
the one hand, the parents wanted their high schoolers at home to both avoid the
worldly influences of high school and to ensure that their daughters “acquire Amish
attitudes favoring manual work and self-reliance and the specific skills needed to
perform the adult role of an Amish farmer or housewife.”184 On the other hand,
perhaps the daughters wanted to stay in public school and acquire skills beyond that
of an Amish housewife.
Whether rightly or wrongly, the Yoder majority concluded that the parents’ and
daughters’ interests were aligned.185 Instead, the Court worried that the compulsory
attendance might cause “great psychological harm to Amish children.”186 To be sure,
Wisconsin tried to make the case that Amish children would find themselves “illequipped” should they choose to leave the community,187 but the Court rejected the
claim as “highly speculative” and unsupported by the record,188 which was devoid of
any disagreement between parents and children.189 Quite the opposite: the one
daughter whose viewpoints were noted also expressed a desire to leave public

182. Cf. Alexandre, 555 F.3d at 1299 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Every case that has ever discussed
the issue of ‘parental upbringing’ dealt with the conflict between a parent’s right and a State’s
attempted curtailment of that right, not a conflict between parent and child.”).
183. Cf. Jocelyn Floyd, Note, The Power of the Parental Trump Card: How and Why
Frazier v. Winn Got It Right, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 791, 808 (2010) (“[T]he tone of the entire
opinion respected the parental concern of maintaining the Amish way of life through raising
children in accordance with Amish values. . . . [and there was] no indication that the Court
would give the child’s contrary desire much, if any, weight were the child and parent to be at
odds with each other.”).
184. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 211 (1972).
185. Id. at 218 (noting that attendance at public high schools “contravenes the basic
religious tenets and practice of the Amish faith, both as to the parent and the child”).
186. Id. at 212.
187. Id. at 224 (“The State, however, supports its interest in providing an additional one or
two years of compulsory high school education to Amish children because of the possibility
that some such children will choose to leave the Amish community, and that if this occurs they
will be ill-equipped for life.”).
188. Id. at 224–25.
189. Id. at 231 (“Our holding in no way determines the proper resolution of possible
competing interests of parents, children, and the State in an appropriate state court proceeding
in which the power of the State is asserted on the theory that Amish parents are preventing
their minor children from attending high school despite their expressed desires to the
contrary.”).
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school.190 In short, the Court did not consider the case “one in which any harm to the
physical or mental health of the child . . . has been demonstrated or may be properly
inferred.”191
Despite rejecting the best interest of the child standard, Troxel is not to the
contrary.192 Recall that the Supreme Court held that, notwithstanding the trial court’s
determination that visitation with paternal grandparents was in the children’s best
interests,193 the mother’s right to control the upbringing of her daughters took
precedent,194 and that the law allowing the grandparents to petition for visitation was
unconstitutional.195 Thus, this case seems to squarely present a clash between the
parent’s interests and the children’s. However, the young children themselves were
not consulted, so it is actually a clash between the mother making a decision on
behalf of her children and the state making a decision on their behalf.196 Moreover,
nothing indicated that the mother’s decision overrode her daughters’ preferences.
Also, the Court had no reason to conclude the mother had acted against her
daughters’ best interests. In addition to the presumption “that natural bonds of
affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children,”197 nothing
suggested any unfitness on the mother’s part.198
Crucial to both decisions was the conclusion that the exercise of parental rights
was not in any way detrimental to their offspring. As several cases make clear,
parents’ substantive due process rights end where harm to children begins. This point
was established early in Prince v. Massachusetts, another case which implicated both
parental and religious rights.199 Mrs. Prince was a Jehovah’s Witness and the
guardian of nine-year-old Betty. She challenged the state’s child labor laws, which
prevented Betty from selling religious tracts in the evening, as required by their
religion. The Court described Prince’s interests as “sacred,” adding that “It is cardinal
with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents.”200

190. Id. at 231 n.21.
191. Id. at 230; see also id. at 234 (“The record strongly indicates that accommodating the
religious objections of the Amish by forgoing one, or at most two, additional years of
compulsory education will not impair the physical or mental health of the child.”).
192. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
193. Id. at 61.
194. Id. at 63.
195. Id. at 60 (“Section 26.10.160(3) of the Revised Code of Washington permits ‘[a]ny
person’ to petition a superior court for visitation rights ‘at any time,’ and authorizes that court
to grant such visitation rights whenever ‘visitation may serve the best interest of the child.’”).
196. Id. at 67 (“Should the judge disagree with the parent's estimation of the child's best
interests, the judge’s view necessarily prevails.”); Sher, supra note 159, at 169 (“[A]lthough
it is ostensibly the child whose ‘best interest’ is at stake, courts generally are called upon to
balance two perceptions of the child’s best interest, neither of which necessarily emanates
from the individual child.”).
197. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68.
198. Id.
199. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164 (1944) (“[S]he rests squarely on freedom
of religion under the First Amendment, applied by the Fourteenth to the states. She buttresses
this foundation, however, with a claim of parental right as secured by the due process clause
of the latter Amendment.”).
200. Id. at 166.
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At the same time, the Court emphasized, no right is absolute,201 and the well-being
of the child always comes first.202 Thus, the state may insist that a child be vaccinated,
over parental objections.203 And it may insist that a child obey child labor laws, over
parental objections.204 To prevent the “crippling effects of child employment,”205 and
to ensure “the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as
citizens,” 206 the state’s law trumps the parent’s rights.
Yoder itself explicitly acknowledged that “the power of the parent, even when
linked to a free exercise claim, may be subject to limitation under Prince if it appears
that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child.”207
Accordingly, lower courts regularly overrule parents’ refusal to provide medical care
to their child.208 For example, Jehovah’s Witness parents do not have the right to
withhold blood transfusions from their ill children.209 “[C]ourts universally hold that
lifesaving medical treatment can be required notwithstanding the parents' sincere
religious [or nonreligious] objections.”210 In sum, parental rights must give way when
the health or safety of their charges are at stake.

201. Id. (“[N]either rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation.”).
202. The state is said to be acting in its role as parens patriae when it steps in to protect
those who cannot protect themselves. Natalie Loder Clark, Parens Patriae and a Modest
Proposal for the Twenty-First Century: Legal Philosophy and a New Look at Children's
Welfare, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 381, 382 (2000) (“Parens patriae, literally ‘parent of the
country,’ is the government’s power and responsibility, beyond its police power over all
citizens, to protect, care for, and control citizens who cannot take care of themselves,
traditionally ‘infants, idiots, and lunatics,’ and ‘who have no other protector.’”); Daniel B.
Griffith, The Best Interests Standard: A Comparison of the State's Parens Patriae Authority
and Judicial Oversight in Best Interests Determinations for Children and Incompetent
Patients, 7 ISSUES L. & MED. 283, 287–88 (1991) (“The doctrine of parens patriae has its
origin in England and applied to the king and the prerogative of the crown to protect those
subjects who could not protect themselves. . . . The power formerly vested in the royal
sovereign has now been transferred to each state. The Supreme Court has recognized this as
part of a long-standing tradition.”).
203. Cf. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166–67 (“Thus, he cannot claim freedom from compulsory
vaccination for the child . . . on religious grounds. The right to practice religion freely does
not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter
to ill health or death.”) (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)).
204. Id. at 168–69.
205. Id. at 168.
206. Id. (“A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded
growth of young people into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies.”).
207. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233–34 (1972).
208. Ellen B. Becker, Note, In re Hofbauer: May Parents Choose Unorthodox Medical
Care for Their Child?, 44 ALB. L. REV. 818, 822 n.15 (1980) (“[Courts] have unanimously
held that when a child’s life is in imminent danger, medical care is necessary and a parental
refusal, no matter on what grounds, constitutes neglect and authorizes state intervention.”).
209. See, e.g., State v. Perricone, 181 A.2d 751 (N.J. 1962); Matter of McCauley, 565
N.E.2d 411, 413 (Mass. 1991); In re Guardianship of L.S. & H.S., 87 P.3d 521, 527 (Nev.
2004) (“[T]he child’s interest in self-preservation and the State’s interests in protecting the
welfare of children and the integrity of medical care outweigh the parents’ interests in the care,
custody and management of their children, and their religious freedom.”).
210. B. Jessie Hill, Whose Body? Whose Soul? Medical Decision-Making on Behalf of
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In contrast, the pledge laws in Florida and Texas explicitly make parents the victor
when their rights and their children’s best interests collide.211 If parents want to force
their children to recite the Pledge of Allegiance at school every day, the state gives
them the power to do so. Yet as discussed in Part II, the compelled speech harms
objecting students. Granted, the compulsion is not on par with denying children
needed medical treatment, but it does compromise children’s well-being and
development. A student’s body is pressed into service of a message contrary to their
conscience.212 Instead of helping to develop the faculties students will need as future
citizens—the ability to question, analyze, and criticize as they contribute to political
discourse—these laws trample on them.213 To the extent that parents have rights visà-vis their children, they were meant to promote their children’s development and
wellbeing, not crush them.
The constitutional right to parent was meant to limit the state, not undermine
children. In fact, the state may step in when parents exploit their right to control the
education and upbringing of their children to hurt rather than nurture those
children.214 There is a limit to parental power, and it would be a bizarre irony if a
right that is generally curtailed when it harms children is used to justify a law that
harms children.
D. Parental Rights vs Children’s Immaturity
Finally, while the Supreme Court has on occasion upheld a government-imposed
requirement that children consult their parents before exercising a constitutional
right, it is only when the Court has thought that the potentially serious consequences
combined with a child’s immaturity necessitated parental guidance. “Certain
decisions are considered by the State to be outside the scope of a minor’s ability to
act in his own best interest or in the interest of the public.”215 Deciding whether to
say the pledge is not one of those situations justifying state interference.
As mentioned earlier, minors cannot undergo surgery without parental
permission.216 Nor may they join the military, or purchase a firearm, or marry.217 The

Children and the Free Exercise Clause Before and After Employment Division v. Smith, 32
CARDOZO L. REV. 1857, 1860 (2011).
211. Frazier ex rel. Frazier v. Winn, 535 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008) (“The State, in
restricting the student’s freedom of speech, advances the protection of the constitutional rights
of parents.”).
212. Seanna Shiffrin argues that the compulsion can affect their minds as well. See supra
note 127.
213. Hamilton, supra note 137, at 1056 (“Young citizens’ accumulated experiences in turn
can significantly influence the future mature citizens they will become.”).
214. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167 (1944) (“[T]he state has a wide range of
power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child’s welfare.”).
215. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72 (1976); see also
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (“We have recognized three reasons justifying the
conclusion that the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults: the
peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed,
mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing.”).
216. See supra notes 51–54 and accompanying text.
217. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 444–45 (1990) (“The State has a strong and
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assumption is that these are life-altering decisions, and that those under eighteen may
not be mature or wise enough to make them on their own. To join the military is to
commit to serve several years, possibly in combat zones.218 Matrimony is (ideally)
for life. Firearms are deadly. Invasive surgery, too, can come with serious risks.
“These rulings have been grounded in the recognition that, during the formative years
of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and
judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them.”219
This is not to say that there is consensus about when these choices arise. Some
might argue the Court is overly solicitous on matters related to sexuality. Thus, as
mentioned in Part I, over fifty years ago the Supreme Court upheld a ban on the sale
of “girlie” magazines to minors, precluding their purchase without parental
consent.220 The Ginsberg Court recognized that both parental substantive due process
rights221 and minors’ First Amendment rights were at stake,222 but sided with the
parents due to what they perceived as the potential harm.223 The dangerousness of
these publications, which are not obscene but do show naked women,224 may seem
dubious to twenty-first century eyes, but at the time, it was uncontroverted that
exposure to these sex magazines could damage young readers.225

legitimate interest in the welfare of its young citizens, whose immaturity, inexperience, and
lack of judgment may sometimes impair their ability to exercise their rights wisely. That
interest . . . justifies state-imposed requirements that a minor obtain his or her parent’s consent
before undergoing an operation, marrying, or entering military service . . . .”); see also Cornell
L. Sch., Marriage Laws of the Fifty States, District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, LEGAL
INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/table_marriage [https://perma.cc/6XY6EK8W] (listing parental consent requirements for each state).
218. Joining the Military: What You Should Know Before Committing, MILITARY.COM,
https://www.military.com/join-armed-forces/making-commitment.html
[https://perma.cc/PZ98-U6S3].
219. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635.
220. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (“[T]he prohibition against sales to
minors does not bar parents who so desire from purchasing the magazines for their children.”).
221. Id. (“The legislature could properly conclude that parents and others, teachers for
example, who have this primary responsibility for children’s well-being are entitled to the
support of laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility.”).
222. Id. at 636–37. The Court noted that the state also had an interest in ensuring the wellbeing of minors. Id. at 640 (“The State also has an independent interest in the well-being of its
youth.”).
223. Id. at 637 (“We conclude that we cannot say that the statute invades the area of
freedom of expression constitutionally secured to minors.”); Id. at 649–50 (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (“I think a State may permissibly determine that, at least in some precisely
delineated areas, a child . . . is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which
is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees.”).
224. Id. at 631–33.
225. Id. at 641 (“In Meyer v. State of Nebraska, . . . we were able to say that children's
knowledge of the German language ‘cannot reasonably be regarded as harmful.’ That cannot
be said by us of minors’ reading and seeing sex material.”); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,
636 (1979) (“The Court was convinced that the New York Legislature rationally could
conclude that the sale to children of the magazines in question presented a danger against
which they should be guarded.”).
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The same decision is less likely to be made today. As it happens, attempts to
expand the reasoning of Ginsberg from sexually explicit to explicitly violent speech
failed. In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association,226 the Supreme Court
struck down a California law requiring minors to obtain parental consent in order to
purchase video games containing a high level of violence.227 The Court held that
although the state has the power to protect minors from harm, it did not encompass
“a free-floating power to restrict the ideas to which children may be exposed.”228 The
Court likewise rejected as justification for the law that it helped further parental rights
by ensuring parents decide what is appropriate for their children.229 Barring protected
speech “just in case” parents would disapprove was a questionable means of aiding
parental rights,230 especially given the parents who simply would not care.231
Accordingly, minors’ speech rights prevailed over parental ones. If minors do not
need parental consent for violent speech, they certainly do not need it for nonviolent
speech.
Abortion is an area where the Court has upheld parental consent for minors.232
Yet abortion too is readily distinguishable from the pledge. Underlying the Court’s
acceptance of parental consent laws is the belief that a young woman’s decision to
end an unwanted pregnancy may not be in her best interest.233 Since first-trimester
abortions are more than ten times safer than childbirth, the risk cannot stem from the
physical consequences.234 Rather, the Supreme Court seems to labor under the belief
that abortion may be psychologically traumatic.235 Its parental consent decisions only
hint at this belief with remarks about “grave decision[s]”236 and “grave emotional

226. 564 U.S. 786 (2011).
227. The video games allowed players to kill, maim, dismember, or sexually assault images
of human beings. Id. at 789.
228. Id.; see also id. at 795 (“Speech that is neither obscene as to youths nor subject to
some other legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas
or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them.”).
229. Id. at 802 (“California claims that the Act is justified in aid of parental authority: By
requiring that the purchase of violent video games can be made only by adults, the Act ensures
that parents can decide what games are appropriate.”).
230. Id. (“At the outset, we note our doubts that punishing third parties for conveying
protected speech to children just in case their parents disapprove of that speech is a proper
governmental means of aiding parental authority.”).
231. Id. at 804 (“Not all of the children who are forbidden to purchase violent video games
on their own have parents who care whether they purchase violent video games.”).
232. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981);
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S.
502 (1990).
233. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 642 (1979) (“Yet, an abortion may not be the best choice for the
minor.”).
234. Elizabeth G. Raymond & David A. Grimes, The Comparative Safety of Legal Induced
Abortion and Childbirth in the United States, 119 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 215 (2012),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22270271 [https://perma.cc/8WA9-PTDD] (“The risk
of death associated with childbirth is approximately 14 times higher than that with abortion.”).
235. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 412 (describing abortion as “a decision that has potentially
traumatic and permanent consequences”).
236. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 641 (describing abortion as “a grave decision”).
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and psychological consequences.”237 Later decisions were plainer: “While we find
no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude
some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and
sustained. Severe depression and loss of esteem can follow.”238 As it happens,
multiple scientific studies refute this misconception, finding that abortion is
overwhelmingly a relief and rarely traumatic.239 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
premised the constitutionality of parental consent for abortion on the assumption that
abortion has such serious ramifications that a minor should not obtain one without
consulting with her parents.240
Although “the State commonly protects its youth . . . from their own immaturity
by requiring parental consent to or involvement in important decisions by minors,”241
the choice of participating or abstaining from daily recitation of the pledge is not one
of them. The consequences are not severe. To abstain from the pledge brings with it
no long-term commitment like joining the military or getting married. On the
contrary, a student can change their mind from one day to the next.242 There is no
physical risk, as there may be with joining the military, purchasing a firearm, or
undergoing surgery. Nor are there any serious psychological consequences, as the
Court (perhaps mistakenly) believed would result from reading girlie magazines or
having an abortion.
Moreover, at least with older students, the parents do not necessarily have any
greater insight than their children.243 Whether or not to make a political statement,
for example, is an intellectual, cognitive decision, and according to developmental
scientists, by age fifteen or sixteen “basic cognitive and information-processing
abilities are mature.”244 Because these teens’ intellectual facilities are as mature as
adults’,245 the immaturity justification for requiring parental guidance fails.

237. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 412–13 (expressing concern about “the potentially grave
emotional and psychological consequences of the decision to abort”).
238. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007).
239. See Caroline Mala Corbin, Abortion Distortions, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1175,
1179–86 (2014) (summarizing scientific evidence); see also Amanda D’Ambrosio, Study:
Relief Most Common Emotion 5 Years Post-Abortion, MEDPAGE TODAY (Jan 13, 2020),
https://www.medpagetoday.com/obgyn/pregnancy/84345 [https://perma.cc/Z9GY-PCF9].
240. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 411 (“The medical, emotional, and psychological
consequences of an abortion are serious and can be lasting; this is particularly so when the
patient is immature.”).
241. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 637; see also id. at 638–39 (“Legal restrictions on minors,
especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child’s chances for
the full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free society meaningful and
rewarding.”).
242. Tess Slattery, Note, Freedom from Compulsion, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 819, 843
(2010) (“First, the choice is not permanent. A child could reverse her or his decision not to
participate in the Pledge.”).
243. Hamilton, supra note 137, at 1109 (“[R]esearchers have consistently found that ‘[t]he
logical reasoning and basic information-processing abilities of 16-year-olds are comparable
to’ or ‘essentially indistinguishable’ from those of adults. . . . By age sixteen, these basic
cognitive abilities are mature.”).
244. Id. at 1063–64.
245. Hamilton acknowledges that even though adolescents may have all the necessary
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Furthermore, “in those contexts where [students] have achieved decision-making
competence, they should correspondingly have decisional autonomy.”246 Whether or
not to join the pledge is one of those contexts. Frazier,247 who was a high school
junior, and Landry,248 who was a high school senior, certainly had the ability to make
their own decisions.
In addition, the desired outcome of public education—and many parents’
childrearing—is a citizen with the critical thinking skills to choose their own
religious, ethical, and political commitments.249 But to develop these abilities, minors
need to practice decision-making skills, especially when the stakes are low.250 Rather
than allowing them to develop these capacities, parental consent pledge laws
undercut the student’s ability to learn how to participate in society.
Finally, an absolute veto power over their children’s contrary wishes does not
necessarily follow from a Supreme Court determination that parental guidance would
be helpful for minors exercising constitutional rights.251 Even with abortion, states
may require parental consent or notification only if there is a judicial bypass
alternative.252 As the Supreme Court held, the parent’s constitutional rights do not

cognitive abilities to make reasonable decisions, “real-world stressors can confound their
capacities and impede their decision making.” Id. at 1064. However, these stressors, such as
the need “to quickly assess and react to risk, to reason while highly stressed or in the heat of
passion, to make decisions in unfamiliar circumstances, or to act in the presence of peers” are
not present in the pledge decision. Id. In fact, students opting not to follow their classmates in
reciting the pledge usually make that choice in spite of peer pressure. Thus, young people’s
vulnerability to these stressors may counsel against letting teens drive or enter combat, id., but
they should not impact teens’ decision about whether or not to recite the pledge.
246. Id. at 1063.
247. See supra notes 5–8 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 9–15 and accompanying text.
249. Hamilton, supra note 137, at 1080.
250. Harry Brighouse, How Should Children Be Heard?, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 691, 703 (2003)
(“[I]t is often observed, and correctly, that one needs to practice skills in order to develop
them, and that therefore children should be given considerable latitude with respect to
particular arenas of agency in order for them to become competent.”).
251. It is true that the Supreme Court held parents may override their children’s substantive
due process rights and commit them to a mental health care facility. Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S.
584, 604 (1979) (“The fact that a child may balk at hospitalization . . . does not diminish the
parents’ authority to decide what is best for the child.”). Nevertheless, this case is easily
distinguishable and does not support the pledge laws. First, the Supreme Court held that
parents do not have “absolute and unreviewable discretion” and may commit their child only
if a neutral factfinder determines that commitment is necessary. Id. at 604, 606. Second, the
minor is assumed, by reason of mental illness, incapable of assessing what is best. Id. at 603
(“Most children, even in adolescence, simply are not able to make sound judgments
concerning many decisions, including their need for medical care or treatment.”). Third, the
minor is at real risk of harm. In contrast, the pledge involves a minor that has the maturity to
make the decision, and there is no danger to physical or mental well-being.
252. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 639 (1979) (“We previously had held in Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), that a State could not
lawfully authorize an absolute parental veto over the decision of a minor to terminate her
pregnancy.”); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 510–11 (1990) (“Danforth
established that, in order to prevent another person from having an absolute veto power over
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trump the daughter’s constitutional rights.253 If parents cannot override their
children’s rights in situations where the court believes there is a risk to the child, they
certainly should not have that power when there is no risk at all.254 To hold otherwise
would mean that “the parents’ will would control the child’s life and extinguish
[their] distinct personhood.”255
***
In sum, although “the Court has held that the States validly may limit the freedom
of children to choose for themselves in the making of important, affirmative choices
with potentially serious consequences,”256 the decision whether to participate or not
participate in the Pledge of Allegiance does not carry potentially serious
consequences. Even when the Supreme Court has allowed states to mandate parental
guidance for important decisions, the Court has rejected handing parents veto power
when children’s own constitutional rights were also at stake. It makes even less sense
to award parents control over students’ speech in school when minors are mature
enough to make their own decisions. Indeed, exercising this decision making is
crucial to developing their capacities as future citizens—the avowed goal of public
school education.
V. STRICT SCRUTINY
The bottom line is that any content-based speech regulation must pass strict
scrutiny. That is, first, the pledge rule must advance a compelling government
interest, and second, it must be narrowly tailored to accomplish that interest. This is
basic free speech doctrine. The analysis might be different had the regulation
satisfied one of the school speech exceptions, but it does not. The exceedingly poor
tailoring of the rule raises the very real likelihood that the state’s asserted motive—
the already questionable claim that the rule advances the substantive due process
rights of parents in Florida and Texas257—was really just a pretext for imposing state
orthodoxy.

a minor’s decision to have an abortion, a State must provide some sort of bypass procedure if
it elects to require parental consent.”).
253. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976) (“Any
independent interest the parent may have in the termination of the minor daughter's pregnancy
is no more weighty than the right of privacy of the competent minor mature enough to have
become pregnant.”).
254. Hamilton, supra note 137, at 1077 (“By denying all others absolute, unchecked power
over them, the state ensures that even totally dependent immature citizens remain distinct
persons, not wholly subsumed by the will of another.”).
255. Hamilton, supra note 137, at 1078 (“But if the state were to defer absolutely to a
child’s parents, then the parents’ will would control the child’s life and extinguish his distinct
personhood.”).
256. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979).
257. Frazier ex rel. Frazier v. Winn, 535 F.3d 1279, 1285 (11th Cir. 2008) (“We conclude
that the State’s interest in recognizing and protecting the rights of parents on some educational
issues is sufficient to justify the restriction of some students’ freedom of speech.”). While this
Essay was in production, Florida passed the Parents’ Bill of Rights. As a state law, it has no
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A. State’s Interest
As should be apparent from Part III, it is doubtful whether Florida or Texas have
succeeded in proving that their law advances a compelling government interest.258
Although parents have a right to choose whether or not their child attends the local
public school, they have never had much control over what occurs inside that public
school. On the contrary, states generally dispute such claims, raising questions about
why in this one instance Florida and Texas suddenly support parent intervention.
Although parental guidance may be needed for decisions that a child is too immature
to make on their own, especially if a rash decision could harm them, abstaining from
the pledge is not one of them. It is quite the reverse: imposing their parents’ will is
harmful, and parents’ substantive due process rights do not extend to inflicting harm
on those they are meant to protect.
B. Narrow Tailoring
1. Poor Tailoring
Even assuming the state interest in protecting parental rights were somehow
compelling, the law is not well calculated to advancing it. Were ensuring parents’
rights vis-à-vis the Pledge of Allegiance the true goal, then the school would require
parents’ involvement for either choice, not just the state’s disfavored one. Florida or
Texas schools could have done that by sending students home with questionnaires
asking all parents whether they wanted their children to participate or abstain in the
daily recitation. Or, a less intrusive permission slip could inform parents that unless
they requested their child’s participation or abstention from the pledge, their child
would decide.259 Instead, parents who favor the pledge need do nothing; only parents
who prefer otherwise must act. “While some of the legislation’s effect may indeed

effect on the constitutional analysis in this Article. But it is worth noting that it is framed as
parents’ rights against the state: “the state, its political subdivisions, other governmental
entities, or other institutions may not infringe on parental rights without demonstrating specific
information.” While it reaffirms parents’ right to make medical decisions for their minor
children, parents’ rights with respect to school curriculum is limited to accessing their child’s
school records, inspecting their child’s instructional materials, and recusing their children from
recitation of the pledge, sexuality education, and dissections in biology. HB 241,
https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2021/241/BillText/er/PDF [https://perma.cc/NE6NXYRM].
258. In rejecting a law requiring that parents of public-school students who refuse to pledge
be notified of the refusal, the Third Circuit held that “the Commonwealth’s stated interest of
parental notification is simply not ‘so compelling of an interest’ as to justify the viewpoint
discrimination that significantly infringes students’ First Amendment rights.” Circle Sch. v.
Pappert, 381 F.3d 172, 181 (3d Cir. 2004).
259. Alternatively, “[a] policy compelling Pledge recitation only upon parents’ affirmative
request would protect the school’s stated interest in a manner that restricts significantly less
protected speech than does the current policy.” Amicus Brief of Public Good and the Center
for Constitutional Rights, Frazier v. Smith, No. 08-1351, 2009 WL 1931582, at *20 (U.S. July
1, 2009).
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be in support of what some parents of the restricted children actually want, its entire
effect is only in support of what the State thinks parents ought to want.”260
The pledge laws’ poor tailoring may also be described as overinclusive and
underinclusive. In Brown, the Supreme Court held that parental permission for
violent video games, “as a means of assisting concerned parents[,] . . . is seriously
overinclusive because it abridges the First Amendment rights of young people whose
parents . . . think violent video games are a harmless pastime.”261 Likewise, parental
permission for declining to pledge is overinclusive because it infringes the First
Amendment rights of students whose parents’ beliefs align with their children’s or
who are not seeking that kind of power over their children.262 More obviously, the
pledge laws are also grossly underinclusive because, as described above, they do not
seek parental approval for the choice to participate.
2. Pretext for State Orthodoxy
Eighty years ago, the Barnette Court insisted that “If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”263 The lopsidedness of
these pledge laws reveals that the parental rights justification is simply pretext for
imposing the state orthodoxy. Orthodoxy is particularly corrosive to democracy
when the censored opinion is one critical of the government.
In essence, the government is trying to accomplish indirectly what it is clearly
prohibited from doing directly. That is, Barnette established unequivocally that
schools cannot force students to pledge allegiance to the flag,264 as it
unconstitutionally forces students “to utter what is not in [their] mind.”265 Moreover,

260. Brown v. Ent. Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 804 (2011). The Brown Court
continued: “This is not the narrow tailoring to ‘assisting parents’ that restriction of First
Amendment rights requires.” Id.
261. Id. at 805.
262. There may be all kinds of reasons parents might not opt out that have nothing to do
with their desire to have their children recite the Pledge of Allegiance: “[It] could reflect a
desire that the child recite the Pledge, but it could equally well reflect the parent's indifference,
fear of coming to the attention of authorities (perhaps because of immigration status), fear of
making waves or angering authority, illiteracy or shame at poor writing skills, to name only a
few possibilities.” Amicus Brief of Public Good and the Center for Constitutional Rights,
Frazier, 2009 WL 1931582, at *20.
263. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
264. This right is so bedrock that school officials who violate it are not eligible for qualified
immunity. Amicus Brief of Public Good and the Center for Constitutional Rights, Frazier,
2009 WL 1931582, at *3 (citing Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004))
(stating that student’s right to decline to say the pledge was so clearly established that teacher
and principal could not claim qualified immunity for violating that right: “Under Barnette, any
reasonable person would have known that disciplining . . . for refusing to recite the pledge
impermissibly chills . . . First Amendment rights”).
265. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 634. Barnette also thought mandatory pledges were bad policy:
“individual freedom of mind in preference to officially disciplined uniformity for which
history indicates a disappointing and disastrous end.” Id. at 637.
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the Supreme Court recognized that the pledge may be repugnant for political as well
as religious reasons. “Symbols of State often convey political ideas just as religious
symbols come to convey theological ones.”266 To circumvent the blatant
unconstitutionality of compelled pledges, Texas and Florida give parents the right to
compel pledges. As Judge Barkett of the Eleventh Circuit observed in dissent, “this
statute in its operation delegates a right to the parent that the State constitutionally
cannot itself possess.”267 Yet, as the Judge continues, “The State cannot give what it
does not have.”268
CONCLUSION
Since Barnette, it has been established that the state cannot force students to
pledge allegiance to the U.S. flag. No subsequent decision on student speech alters
that holding. To circumvent this clear rule, Florida and Texas claim their law
requiring parental permission to abstain from the pledge furthers parental rights. This
is nonsense. Parental rights have little force in schools, and no force when they clash
with children’s best interests. And compelling students to pledge against their will is
not in their best interests. In any event, the laws’ poor tailoring highlights that the
state is merely using parental rights as a pretext to enforce a state-mandated message.
State-enforced orthodoxy is always dangerous, and never more so when the message
suppressed is criticism of the state itself. These laws, like the acts that trigger students
desire to take a knee, need to go.

266. Id. at 632.
267. Frazier ex rel. Frazier v. Alexandre, 555 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 2009) (Barkett,
J., dissenting).
268. Id. (Barkett, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1293–94 (“Because the State itself cannot
compel speech, it lacks the capacity to delegate to parents the power to compel this speech.”).
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